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REVISING A STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE:
ISSUES FOR THE NORTH DAKOTA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

RICHARD B. KUHNS

*

I. INTRODUCTION
The need to improve the quality of this country's judicial systems
has been a matter of growing concern for most of this century.'
The forthcoming state Constitutional Convention 2 will afford the opportunity to evaluate and reform North Dakota's judical system in
light of this concern.
The purpose of this article is to facilitate this evaluation and reform by setting forth the major issues with which the Constitutional
Convention should deal in drafting the constitution's judicial article.
With the exception of certain premises about the nature and function
4
of a constitutions and about the need for a unified court structure,
this article is not concerned with promoting a particular viewpoint
but only with pointing out and clarifying issues. For this reason, it
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota; A.B., 1964, L.L.B., 1967,
Stanford University.
1. For background and a brief history of judicial reform in this country, see Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV.
729 (1906), reprinted with a more recent introduction by the author at 8 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1 (1956); THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN RETROSPECT: RoscoE POUND'S 1906
ADDRESS IN A HALF-CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE (Harding ed. 1957); ELLIOT, IMPROVING OUR
COURTS: SELECTED STUDIES IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1959) ; EARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1957); Winters, The National Movement Toward

Legal and Judicial Reform, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 33 (1968).
The literature of judicial reform is abundant. For a general sampling of the
variety of proposals which have been made, see Symposium, 47 TEX. L. RErv. 965 (1969) ;
THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION (Jones ed. 1965) ; ZEISEL, KALVIN, &
BACHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS (1959) ; MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (Vanderbilt ed. 1949); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SELECTED READINGS ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND ITS IMPROVEMENT (Winters & Lowe ed. 1969).

For bibliographies on judicial reform, see NATIONAL MUNICIPAL

A SELEC(2d ed. 1967) ;
(1970); ABA SECTION
LEAGUE,

Trvu BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 93-109, Supp. 12-14

PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK: THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE (5th ed. Stevens ed. 1971) (hereinafter referred to as ABA HANDBOOK) ; AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF COURT ORGANIZATION

REFORM (1970).
2. In 1969 the North Dakota state legislature passed a statute authorizing a constitutional convention upon the approval of the electorate. N.D. SESS. LAWS ch. 462 (1969).
The voters approved the proposal on September 1, 1970, and the 1971 Session of the
legislature appropriated funds for the Convention, which will convene in January, 1972.
N.D. SEss. LAWS ch. 33 (1971).
3. See p. 221 infra.
4. See pp. 225-26 infra.
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does not include a specific proposal, nor does it deal with the problem of establishing a transitional schedule for implementing a new
5
judicial article.
II. SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A.

State Constitutions Generally.

Any major constitutional reform must necessarily begin with a
consideration of the underlying premises about the nature and function of a constitution. An extended discussion of these issues is unnecessary here. 6 Nonetheless, to insure that there is no misunderstanding of the premises upon which this article is based, these matters deserve brief attention.
There are at least four basic, identifiable functions for a state
constitution to serve: (1) to establish or provide for the establishment
and maintenance of the basic governmental institutions, such as the
legislature, the executive department, and the judiciary; (2) to define and limit the powers of these institutions in a manner that
creates the optimal balance of power between them; (3) to define
basic individual liberties; and (4) to provide an appropriate method
for revising the constitution to meet changing conditions.7 In drafting a document to meet these needs, a major consideration that will
affect all specific issues is the extent to which the constitution should
concern itself with detail. There are essentially two options available: Either the constitution can be drafted in terms of general principles leaving the specific implementation of those principles to the
various branches of government through delegations of power limited
only by the general principles and by concern for maintaining a
proper balance of power; 8 or it can be drafted as a specific, detailed document incorporating many provisions that under the first
5. Any comprehensive constitutional amendment affecting the structure of governmental institutions should be accompanied by a schedule which sets forth the means of
transition from the old structure to the new one. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 112-116 (6th ed. 1963). This is necessary to insure continual
authority and functioning of the institutions during the implementation period and to
minimize the impact of the changes on individuals whose jobs may be eliminated.
6. Another article in this issue of the Law Review deals specifically with these issues. Omdahl, The Case for Constitutional Revision in North Dakota, 48 N.D. L. REV.
197 (1971). For other general discussions of the nature and scope of state constitutions, see NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, THE DRAFTING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS: WORKING PAPERS FOR A MANUAL (1967) ; NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1961) ; CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, CON-CON: ISsUES FOR
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1970); STURN, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAHING:
1938-1968 (1970) ; STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (Graves ed.

1967).
7.

NATIONAL

MUNICIPAL

LEAGUE,

SALIENT

ISSUES

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL

(1961).
8.

See e.g., ALAS. CONST.;

HAWAII

CONST.;

MICH. CONST.

REVISION
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approach would be delegated to some specific branch of government
(usually, but not necessarily, the legislature).9
The Federal Constitution is illustrative of the former approach,
and its comparative virtues were extolled early in this country's
history by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.1 0
Perhaps even more important than the difficulty in understanding
an extremely detailed constitution is the fact that such a document
severely limits the opportunities for implementing new solutions to
old problems and for adapting institutions to changed circumstances
and conditions. 1 ' If the only way to alter the status quo is by constitutional amendment, change is not likely unless the constitution is
easily amendable. 12 However, if amendments become frequent, the
constitution loses its force and prestige as a declaration of fundamental principles. 13
Despite general concurrence in the view that a constitution should
be a document of fundamental principles,'14 many state constitutions,
including the present North Dakota Constitution, are replete with detailed provisions governing matters that should more appropriately
be left to the various branches of the state government. 15 This article
is premised on the belief that the Constitutional Convention should
change the nature of the present state constitution to conform to the
criteria set forth by Chief Justice Marshall.
9. See e.g., N.D. CoNsT.; ALA. CONST.; IA CONST. See also THE BOOK OF THE STATES:
1970-1971, at 19 (1970).
10. McCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat 316, 407 (1819).
11.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

REVIsION, supra note 6, at

142-150.

12. For case studies of the politics of constitutional revision, see Martineau, Marjland's 1967-68 Constitutional Convention: Some Lessons for Reformers, 55 IowA L. REv.
1196 (1970); STURM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN MICHIGAN 1961-1962 (1963); NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEW JERSEY: 1940-1947

(1970).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 286 (Mod. Library ed.)
14.

(Madison).

See citations, supra note 6.

15. E.g., the judicial article of the North Dakota Constitution prescribes the manner
in which supreme court decisions shall be rendered: "When a judgment or decree is reversed or confirmed by the supreme court every point fairly arising upon the record of
the case shall be considered and decided, and the reasons therefore shall be concisely
stated in writing, signed by the Judges concurring, filed in the office of the clerk of the
supreme court and preserved with a record of the case. Any judge dissenting therefrom
may give the reason for his dissent in writing over his signature." N.D. CONST. art. IV,
§ 101. See also note 9 supra.

222
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B.

Function and Nature of the Judicial Article:
Some General Considerations

1.

Function of the Judicial Article

The judicial article's prime concern should be the establishment
of a system for the formal, orderly resolution of disputes between
individuals and between individuals and the state. At the very least,
this should entail defining the institutional structure within which
such disputes are to be resolved, setting general perimeters on the
power of that structure, and indicating who has the power to make
specific rules and regulations for implementing and administering
the judicial system.'
To insure the possibility for rational and deliberate decision making in individual cases without political pressure or fear of reprisal,
the constitution should be drafted to avoid any potential political or
other pressure-group influence on the specific decisions that are rendered. 1 This is particularly important since, short of constitutional
amendment, the judicial system will represent the decision making
body of last resort.
2.

Delegation of Powers

The establishment and operation of a high-quality, efficient judicial system will require numerous decisions about such matters as
the salary and number of judges, the number and size of judicial
districts, the rules to effectuate the presentation and processing of
cases, and the rules for internal operation of the courts. The optimal
decisions on many of these matters are dependent upon factors that
are constantly subject to change. 8 In order to give the judicial
system sufficient flexibility to meet current needs and adopt efficient procedures, and to avoid burdening the constitution with minor
details, the power to make these types of decisions should be delegated to the appropriate governmental body. In these areas of concern, the primary responsibility of the Constitutional Convention
should not be with the substance of particular rules, but rather with
choosing the appropriate body to make the rules.
In making any delegation of power the Constitutional Convention has five potential bodies among which to choose: (1) the ex16. For
see Karlen
17. THE
note 1, at

a brief discussion of basic issues to consider in drafting a judpcial article,
& Miller, A New Judicial Article for New York, 39 N.Y. B.J. 9 (1967).
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 508 (Mod. Library ed.) (Hamilton); ELIiOT supra
156-67. See also JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) ;
BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX (1956) ; BAKER, BACK TO BACK-THE DUEL
BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967), all of which deal with the Roosevelt
court packing plan.
18. E.g., financial resources available to the judicial system, population shifts, reform
in the substantive law, Improved administrative procedures, and increased use of computer programming could all have some influenae on the decisions in these areas.
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ecutive branch, (2) the legislature, (3) the judiciary, (4) a special
constitutionally created committee or commission, or (5) the general
electorate. With the exception of the questions of judicial selection
and tenure, 9 the practical alternatives are limited to the legisla20
ture, the judiciary, or an independent commission.
In deciding to which body a particular power should be delegated, there are at least three concerns with which the Convention should
deal:
(1) Which body has the greatest expertise and interest in the
decision? 21
(2) What is the optimal balance of power among governmental
institutions?
(3) To what extent and in what manner should the people of
the state participate in or be able to affect the decision making
process?
The other two questions, which are much broader than the first
one, raise fundamental issues of political philosophy, and in order to
answer them, one must take into account the manner in which various
branches of government operate, the pressures to which they are subject, the visibility of their decision making processes, and the opportunities for public participation in those processes.2 2 Because the
legislative processes are generally the most open, with political factors most apparent and the opportunity to exert public pressure the
most direct,2 1 one concerned primarily with giving the people a
voice in decision making would tend to favor delegating powers to
the legislature rather than the executive or judiciary. In this regard,
it would be appropriate to point out that the need for judicial independence does not extend to independence in rule making power,
determination of the number of judges, and other matters not likely
to interfere with the adjudication of a case under consideration. Alternatively, one primarily concerned with a strong, independent judiciary might caution that the delegation of any power significantly
affecting the judiciary to a non-judicial body might provide that body
19. See pp. 238-42 infra.
20. Although this article considers the independent commission alternative only with
regard to questions of court administration and selection and removal of Judges, the reasons
advanced in

Section III for delegating power to the judiciary would apply equally to an

independent commission composed In whole or in part of judges.
21. The term "interest" Is used in this article to denote a particular concern that a
body may have because of Its make-up and responsibilties. For example, the legislature,
which is responsible for allocating the state's revenues, has an interest in any question
which may put a financial burden on the state. The judiciary has an interest in having
sufficient resources to fulfill its responsibilities and in allocating available judicial resources in the most efficient manner.
22.
(1960)

See e.g., BURNS, DEADLOCK Or DEMOCRACY (1963); NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER
; MrrAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: POLITICS & PROCESS (1966); ADRIAN,

STATE

AND

1966);
23.

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

KEy, AMERICAN
BLAIR,

AMERICAN

(1967);

GRODZINS,

STATE POLITICS: AN
LEGISLATURES

35-58

THE

AMERICAN

INTRODUCTION
(1967).

(1956).

SYSTEM

(Elazar

ed.
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with the opportunity to exert unwarranted political pressures on the
judiciary24
Because issues of political philosophy and concern for the functioning of governmental institutions transcend the specific issues
with which the Convention must deal in drafting the judicial article,
this article's discussion of delegation problems is largely limited to
the first question suggested above-i.e., a consideration of the expertise and interest of various bodies in making decisions that will
affect the judicial system. Hopefully, this limited discussion will assist in clarifying the issues with which to deal in drafting a judicial
article. At the same time, however, omission of the broader issues
from the discussion may mean that the resolutions suggested by the
analysis in this article are not the optimal ones. In making its final
decisions, the Constitutional Convention must keep in mind both the
particular issues raised in Section III, infra, and the more far reaching issues alluded to only briefly here.
3.

Special Judicial Needs in North Dakota
The judicial system should function in a manner that will most
efficiently meet any particular judicial needs which may exist in
North Dakota. This article, however, gives only limited consideration
to such needs2 5 for two reasons: First, although some data exists
concerning the caseload of North Dakota's courts,26 emperical studies and data that might give significant insights into the present
2
functioning of the judiciary are non-existentY.
Secondly, while detailed statistics and studies could be of great assistance in making
decisions about efficient court administration and proper allocation
of resources, 28 such studies would be of only limited value in determining the content of the judicial article. Judicial problems pe24. See TH FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 505 (Mod. Library ed.) (Hamilton).
25. The discussion in Section III makes brief references to the significance of North
Dakota's small population to the question of court structure. Beyond this, however, the
points raised in this article would be equally applicable to any state.
26. Since 1961 the North Dakota Judicial Council has made semi-annual compilations
of the total number of cases filed, pending, and disposed of in the various courts. The
most recent such compilation covers the perioid from July through December, 1970.
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, STATISTICAL COMPILATION (1971).
27. A state bar association committee in 1970 reported that the judicial council "still
lacks effective methods for obtaining . . . information ..
.
NORTH DAKOTA STATE 13AR
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, NORTH DAKOTA
AND THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 3 (1970)
(hereinafter referred to as UNIFIED COURT

STUDY). This, however, is only part of the problem. In additlon to obtaining information
about the number of cases handled by each court, see note 26 supra, it would be helpful
to know how much judicial time is consumed with various types of cases and procedures.
The recent creation of the office of court administrator in North Dakota should facilitate
the gathering of this information. Mr. Calvin Rolfson, the court administrator, antici.
pates that statistics of this nature will be available by the end of 1972. Letter from Mr.
Rolfson to Thomas Schoppert, October 14, 1971.
28. See REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEES ON JUDICIAL SURVEY FOR NORTH DAKOTA 20-21
(undated) (hereinafter referred to as JUDICIAL SURVEY). Cf. Morris & Barnes, The Indiana
Judicial System: An Analysis and Some Renewed Proposals for Reform, 44 IND. L.J. 49
(1968); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT AND THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE (1971).
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culiar to North Dakota today may be non-existent or significantly different even five or ten years from now. The constitution should not
attempt to legislate solutions to these problems, but rather it should
provide the flexibility for solution by delegating the appropriate

powers to various branches of the government.
III.

ISSUES FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
A. The Vesting of Judicial Power
North Dakota, 29 as well as a number of other states,8 0 vests the
judicial power in several independent courts. One of the most significant changes which the Constitutional Convention can recommend
is the unification of the judicial system by vesting all judicial power
in one judicial court. 81
The precise extent of the judicial power would be defined by
other sections of the article, and the one judicial court would have
to be divided into appropriate divisions-at least an appellate court
(the supreme court) and a trial court of general jurisdiction. How82
ever, there would be no courts independent of the one judicial court.
A number of states have been moving in the direction of a uni-

fied system,8 and judicial reformers are unanimous in their advocacy of such a system.- Unification allows the entire court system
to be administered as an integral unit, thus eliminating duplicate
administrative functions and jurisdictional overlaps, which only cause
confusion, delay, and unnecessary expense. 85 In addition, centralized administration would make possible the most efficient allocation
29. "The Judicial power of the state of North Dakota shall be vested in a supreme
court, district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and in such other courts as
may be created by law for cities, incorporated towns and villages." N.D. CONST. art. IV,
§ 85. Contra, AMERIcAN BAR AssocIATIoN

MODEL JUDICIAL

ARTICLE

(hereinafter referred

to as ABA MODEL), which is set forth as an appendix to the article.
80. See e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 6, § 139; N.M. Cower. art. VI, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. 7,
. 2; TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
31. The proposal for a unified court system in North Dakota is not new. In a study
for the state bar association in 1950, Keith Blinn discussed the benefits of a unified trial
court structure for North Dakota with particular reference to the desirability of such a
system in light of North Dakota's small population. Blinn, Survey of the Trial Courts of
the North Dakota Judicial System, 26 N.D. L. REv. 345 (1950). A state bar association
oommittee detailed the problems of the present court system and made similar, but more
comprehensive, recommendations for unification in 1970. UNIFIED COURT STUDY, supra
note 27. The proposals suggested in both of these reports focus primarily on changes
which could be achieved through Judicial and legislative action within the framework of
the present constitution, and for this reason they are both more specific and less comprehensive than the proposal for unification set forth in this article.
32. See ABA MODEL § 1.
33. See e.g., the recent constitutional amendments in the following states: ALAS. CONST.
art. IV; COL. CONST. art. VI; HAWAII CONST. art. V; ILL. CONST. art. 6; MICH. CoNsT. art.
6; N.J. CONST. art. 6; N.C. CONST. art. IV.
34. See e.g., Schwartz, The Unification and Centralization of the Administration of
Justice, 51 J. AM. Jun. SoC'Y. 337 (1968); Karlen & Miller, supra note 16, at 13;
McMilliams, Court Integration and Unification in the Model Judicial Article, 47 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y. 13 (1963); Peck, Court Organizations and Procedures to Meet the Needs of a
Modern Society, 20 ALA. LAW. 181, 183-4 (1959); Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a Sound
Judicial System, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1953); ABA HAnDBo, supra note 1, at 7-11;
POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 272-94 (1940). Nonetheless, communities wishing to
maintain control over their independent courts and those courts' Judicial officers who fear
that unification will eliminate their jobs may oppose complete unification.
35. For particular Jurisdictional problems that exist in North Dakota, see Blinn, supra
Note 31, at 369-70; UNIFIED COURT STUDY, eupra note 27, at 17-19.
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of the state's judicial resources. Judges could be assigned in accordance with immediate caseload demands,18 thus eliminating or at
least greatly reducing the need for part-time judges with the resultant benefit of higher quality, more efficient judicial officers. The
benefits of judicial specialization, which have often been prime considerations in establishing limited jurisdiction courts (e.g. probate
courts and juvenile courts), could still be retained under the unified
37
system by assigning specialized cases to particular judges.
In order to realize the full benefits of unification, there must be a
specific allocation of administrative responsibility and sufficient resources for carrying out necessary administrative functions; 8 the entire state judicial system must be centrally financed so that local economic concerns do not interfere with judicial administration and efficient allocation of resources;19 all of the presently independent courts
must either be abolished or consolidated into the unified system; and
overlapping jurisdictional powers must be eliminated. The judicial
article cannot legislate all of these matters directly and still conform to the basic premise that it should deal only with fundamental
principles, but the judicial article should be carefully drafted to permit these results.
B.

Court Structure
1. Trial Court of General Jurisdiction

(a) Constitutional Mandates
The state judicial system must have a trial court of general
original jurisdictiono40 and the constitution should provide for such
a court as one of the divisions of the unified judicial court. For administrative convenience, it may be appropriate to provide that the
trial court can be divided into districts, which presumably would be
based on population, caseload, and geographic factors. 41 Because
36. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
37. See POUND, supra note 34, at 276.
38. This administrative responsibility should be delegated to the chief Justice, the
supreme court, or a Judicial counccil. See p. 249 infra.
39. Although it would not be necessary to deal with the question of financing
in the Judicial article, the constitution should address itself to this point. See
LEGISLATIVB COMMISSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, NEVADA'S COURT STRUCTURE
36-38 (1968); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT AND
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OP MAINE

63

(1971)

; THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-

TRATION, SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF MARYLAND 65-69 (1967); Karlen & Miller,
supra note 16, at 27, 32.
40. In addition to the general grant of original jurisdiction, it would be desirable for
the constitution to specify that the legislature or judiciary may authorize the general
Jurisdiction court to review the decisions of state administrative agencies. See ABA MODEL
§ 4(2). Such a Provision would clarify the question of which body has the power to determine the nature and extent of Judicial review of administrative decisions. In deciding
to which body this responsibility should be delegated, the Constitutional Convention
should consider the same factors suggested with regard to delegation of the power to
determine the Supreme court's jurisdiction. See p. 234 infra.
41. In addition to distinct geographic districts, it would be appropriate to allow divisions within each geographic unit for the handling of specialized cases. See ABA MODEL §
4(1) & Comment,
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administrative convenience is the primary, if not sole,4 2 reason for
the distinct districts, the constitution should make it clear that judges
are not restricted to sitting in their own districts and that the district divisions are not jurisdictional. The former provision is necessary to allow assignment of judges to meet special caseload needs,'4
while the latter provision would prevent the delay and expense in44
volved in the dismissal and refiling of law suits.
Since the size and number of districts and the number of judges
in each particular district should be determined in light of factors
such as population and availability of transportation, which are constantly subject to change, these matters should not be explicitly
legislated in the constitution. However, to insure that the district
divisions bear a reasonable relationship to judicial needs, the Constitutional Convention might consider imposing a requirement that
each district must have a certain minimum and maximum population distribution and a requirement that there must be at least one
45
district judge for X number of people.
The problem with the first suggestion is that significant developments in the substantive law or judicial administration may make
the optimal answer today obsolete in the future. Although the second
suggestion has the benefit of insuring a type of proportional allocation of judicial resources, there is the practical danger that this type
of provision, even if expressed as a minimum, may tend to become
the maximum.
(b)

Constitutional Delegation

Although most state constitutions delelgate to the legislature
the power to determine the number of trial court judges and the
number and size of trial court judicial districts, 46 it may be appropriate to delegate these powers to the judiciary. 47 Factors favor42. A second possible reason for districting Is suggested at pp. 228-29 fnfra.
43. "[T]he assignment of judges among the various districts or circuits is considered
the most important tool for achieving equitable workloads.
JUDICIAL SURVEY, supra
note 28, at 16 (Emphasis in original).
The North Dakota Constitution presently provides that "Judges of the district courts
may hold court in other districts than their own under such regulations as shall be
prescribed by law." N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 116. The legislature has delegated its power
In this regard to the supreme court. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-02-25, 27-05-22 (1960).
It would seem most appropriate for the constitution to delegate this power directly
to the chief Justice or the supreme court. See ABA MODEL § 4(1) & Comment.
44. Insuring that law suits are filed in the most appropriate and convenient court
may be accomplished through rules of venue. See e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 28-04, 29-03
(1960).
45. Karlen & Miller, s-upra note 16, at 25.
46. See e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 3; TEX. CONST. art 5, § 7. Although the North
Dakota Constitution establishes six specific districts of the district court, N.D. CONST. art.
IV, § 105, it allows the legislature to add additional districts and additional judges to
each district N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 106. The Report of Joint Committees on Judicial
Survey for North Dakota suggests that the constitution delegate the power to determine
districts to the supreme court. JUDICIAL SURVEY, supra note 28, at 13-14.
47. See ABA MODEL § 4(1).
Unlike the legislature, the Judiciary does not have an established mechanism for
making decisions other than in individual cases. For this reason, any grant of power to
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ing delegation of these powers to the judiciary are (1) its constant
awareness of the needs and problems of the trial courts, which
gives it the expertise to make optimal decisions in these areas, and
(2) the speed with which it could make changes to meet current
needs,' 8 a factor that is particularly important if the legislature
meets only bi-annually.49
The legislature has a financial interest in determining the number of trial court judges since it is responsible for the allocation
of the state's revenues.

Beyond this financial interest, there is

the possibility that delegating the power to affect significantly the
costs of the judicial system to a body that does not have the
power initially to allocate the state's revenues could create a confrontation between two branches of government:
For example,
if the judiciary creates twenty-five judgeships and the legislature
appropriates money for only twenty, how is the problem to be
resolved?

0

The legislative interest in determining the size and number
of judicial districts is of a different nature. Except in so far as
districting decisions may result in an inefficient allocation of re-

sources, the legislature's financial interest is non-existent. However,
if there is a desire to insure various constituencies the opportunity
to have their own judge, this goal could be accomplished by giving

the legislature the power to define districts. Of course, legislative
the judiciary should be made specifically to some Individual or court in the judicial system. Since the supreme court is the highest state court and has statewide jurisdiction, it
would usually be most appropriate to delegate power specifically to that body. In situations where delegation to the judiciary is influenced by the need for rapid decision making, see p. 247 infra, or centralizing responsibility, see p. 249 infra, it may be preferable to delegate the power to the chief justice of the supreme court.
48. Giving the chief justice power to temporarily assign judges to different districts
may be sufficient to meet immediate and unusual needs. However, it is questionable
whether the legislature will act with sufficient speed to meet more general
needs. See Cedarquist, The Illtnois Judidial Article: The Proposals for a New Courts Commission and Changes for Trial Court Judges and Magistrates, 51 CHI. B. REC. 302, 305
(1970). Also note that the North Dakota Legislature has failed to respond to many specific proposals for judicial reform in this state. See Blinn, supra note 81, at 367-81;
JUDICIAL SuRvEY, supra note 28, at 25-26: Uwu'vD CoURT STUDY, supra note 27, at 37-42.
49. Such is the case in North Dakota now. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 55.
50. Similar problems have arisen when a legislative body has refused to appropriate
money to pay the salaries of various adjunctive personnel (e.g., clerks, probation officers,
administrators) appointed by the courts. Cases have generally held that the judiciary has
the inherent power to bind the legislative body contractually if the expense is necessary
in order for the judiciary to function. See e.g., Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738
(1963) ; Noble County Council v. State, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Judges for
the Third Judicial Cir. v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969) ; State
ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970); State v. Sullivan, 48
Mont. 320, 137 P. 392 (1913) ; Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949). The
doctrine of inherent judicial authority is necessary to insure that the legislature cannot
withhold funds required for the functioning of the courts. At the same time, however, a
judicial declaration of its inherent authority to make a decision that will result in increased expenditure of funds creates the potential for a constitutional crisis, which will
exist if the legislature refuses to abide by the court's order. To minimize this potential,
the constitution should not delegate to the judiciary power to affect directly the cost of
operating the judicial system unless judicial exercise of that power is essential for the
functioning of the system.
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districting influenced by this type of interest may well result in
a misallocation of judicial resources.
If the Constitutional Convention is divided on the question of
which body should make districting decisions, it might consider
a compromise provision that would give the judiciary the power
to determine the districts in the first instance with the legislature
having the power to overrule those decisions."'
2.

Trial Court of Limited Jurisdiction

One of the important issues for the Constitutional Convention
will be whether to establish or provide for the establishment of
a trial court of limited jurisdiction (herein referred to as a magistrate's court), as one division of the unified judicial court. Such a
court would ease the caseload burden of the general jurisdiction court
by handling minor civil and criminal matters, and the consolidation of
these cases in a separate court could promote administrative efficiency. In addition, the existence of a magistrate's court would allow
the legislature to establish a different (presumably lower) salary
scale for the judicial officers with limited jurisdiction. 52 The lower
salary scale might make it possible to establish magistrate's courts
in some of the sparsely populated areas of the state that otherwise
would be deprived of a local court because of an insufficient caseload to justify assigning a general jurisdiction trial judge to the area.
Unfortunately, the most significant disadvantage of such a court
is a concomitant of its potential economic benefit. The matters
that would most appropriately be assigned to a magistrate's court
are small civil claims, traffic violations, and other minor criminal
matters. Since the only direct contacts that the vast majority of
the people have with our courts involve these types of cases, it
is particularly important that the quality of justice be high. 53 The
lower salary structure would work to defeat this end by not providing a proper incentive for attracting the most qualified magistrates.
Although this problem can be minimized by requiring all magistrates to be admitted to the practice of law in North Dakota
and prohibiting them from practicing law during their terms of
office, 54 the problem cannot be wholly eliminated.
If the Constitutional Convention concludes that a magistrate's
court is desirable, it should address itself to the same questions
considered with regard to the trial court of general jurisdiction.
51. This type of concurrent delegation is discussed In more detail at pp. 251-52 infra.
52. See ABA MODEL § 4(3) & Comment. See also Crowe, A Plea for the Trial Court
of Limited Jurisdiction, 53 JUDICATURE 157 (1969).
53. See Levinthal, Minor Courts-Major Problems. 48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 188 (1965):
Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC,
AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85-123

54.

See pp. 237-38 infra.

(Jones ed. 1965).
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With only one exception, the considerations are the same for both
courts: It is probably not necessary to provide for dividing the
magistrate's court into judicial districts, but rather it would be more
appropriate to establish individual courts in particular locales as the
needs arise.
The Constitutional Convention also must deal with the question
of the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court. Because one primary
advantage of such a court is to ease the caseload of the general
jurisdiction court, and because the factors contributing to a heavy
caseload may vary, the constitution should not spell out the jurisdictional details. It should, however, make it clear that the general
jurisdiction court has original jurisdiction -except in so far as that
jurisdiction is granted exclusively to the magistrate's court, 55 Further, the constitution should make it clear that the jurisdiction of
the magistrate's court cannot vary from place to place in the
state.56 Although varying the jurisdiction would allow the judicial
system to meet the specific needs in each locale, this advantage
is more than offset by the confusion that would exist as attorneys
attempted to ascertain which court had the power to hear a particular case and by the difficulty in administering a judicial system
with numerous courts of varying jurisdictions.
In determining whether the power to establish the jurisdiction
of the magistrate's court should be delegated to the judiciary or
the legislature, the Constitutional Convention should consider the
judiciary's expertise in being able to assess particular caseload
needs as well as its interest in easing the burden of the general
jurisdiction courts. Against these factors, the Convention must balance two legislative interests: First, the legislature arguably has
a financial interest since a severe limitation of the power of the
magistrate's court by the judiciary could limit the opportunity for
55. In addition to this statement about the relationship between the two trial courts'
jurisdictions, the constitution should include a statement that the general jurisdiction
court may review the decisions of the magistrate's court. See ABA MODEL § 4(2). The
constitution should delegate the power to determine the scope of this Jurisdiction to either
the legislature or the judiciary on the basis of the same factors suggested with regard
to allocation of appellate jurisdiction between the supreme court and an intermediate
appellate court. See pp. 235-36 fnfra.
This delegation of power, unless specifically

restricted,

would include the

possi-

bility of allowing de novo review of magistrate's court's decisions. Although de novo review, particularly in criminal cases, has been criticized because of the time and expense
involved in two trials, see UNIFIED COURT STUDY, supra note 27, at 13-14, 35; MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 389, it may be desirable for the
magistrate's court to function as an informal small claims court, see CAL. CODE: CrV. PRO.
ch. 5-A (1954) ; Of. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-08.1 (Supp. 1971), in which case de novo appeal would be necessary. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379,
173 P.2d 38 (1946). To allow this possibility, the constitution should not (place any limitations on the power to make rules for appeal from the magistrate's court. The goal of

eliminating wasteful de novo appeals oan be adequately achieved through upgrading the
level of justice In the magistrate's court by making it a court of record and requiring
that all magistrates be trained lawyers. See p. 238 infra; JNIFYED COURT STUDY, 8UPra
note 27, at 35.
56. A clear statement that there is one court of limited jurisdiction should be sufficient for this purpose. See ABA MODEL § 1.
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effective utilization of lower paid judicial officers. Secondly, the legislature may have an interest in meeting the requests of its constituency for local judges. 5 T Without the power to establish the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court, the legislature could not insure that
the court would fully meet the needs of its constituency. As a
practical matter, however, both of these legislative interests may
be adequately served by giving the legislature power to determine
the total number of magistrates, since it is unlikely that the judiciary
would not take the opportunity to utilize as fully as possible all of
the resources available to it.
If the Constitutional Convention feels that it is appropriate to
provide for a magistrate's court but has reservations about the
immediate need for such a court, the constitution could provide
that the sections of the judicial article dealing with this court
would be implemented only with the approval of the legislature
or the judiciary. The major effect of such a provision would be
to forestall the initial costs (or savings) of integrating such a
court into the unified structure, and thus, the power to implement
the constitutional provisions should be delegated to the same body
which is responsible for making the principal financial decision
with regard to this court, i.e. the body which has the power to
determine the number of magistrates.
3.

Magistrates as Adjuncts to the General Jurisdiction Court

As an alternative to the magistrate's court, the Constitutional
Convention may want to consider a provision which would allow
either the judiciary or legislature to create the office of magistrate
as an adjunct to the general jurisdiction court. 58 If this alternative

is selected, the Constitutional Convention must still deal with all
of the issues suggested in the preceding section.
57. In evaluating this legislative interest the Constitutional Convention should consider the following: "[I]t seems clear that . . . a [township governmental] unit no longer
has a continued usefulness for Judicial purposes under a modern judicial system. It is
obvious that such a unit was not originally established because of the volume of judicial
business within such an area but because of the convenience of having In each local area
a person authorized to hear and determine common minor legal controversies. However,
convenience may not be measured by the single factor of space since accessibility must
also include the factor of 'time.' Thus a system which does not assure that the Justice
will be at a particular place at the particular time, that is, maintain regular hours, does
not assure convenience to the public. Hence, the multiplicity of justices which is the
logical result of the township system spreads the judicial business so thin that no justice
has sufficient judicial business to make his justice work a regular profession which results in defeating the very end which was hoped to be accomplishedj" Blinn, supra note
31, at 357.
58. An Illinois constitutional amendment created such a system in 1964 by providing,
"Subject to law, the circuit judges in each circuit shall appoint magistrates to serve at
their pleasure." ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12 (repealed 1970 when an entirely new constitution was adopted for the state). In 1971 the North Dakota Legislature enacted a similar
provision for small claim's court referees. N.D. CENT. COD
27-08.1-08 (Supp. 1971). A
major defect in both provisions is the absence of job security resulting from the fact
that the magistrate or referee serves at the pleasure of the judge. See Cedarquist, eupra
note 48, at 305.
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Under this alternative, the magistrates would in the first instance be under the administrative control of the general jurisdiction court, while under the separate magistrate's court format there
would be a distinct administrative unit and probably separate staffing. If the primary purpose for having judicial officers with limited
jurisdiction is to ease the workload of the general jurisdiction court,
it would probably be more appropriate to provide that the magistrates be adjuncts of that court. However, if the main concern for
splitting the jurisdiction of the trial courts is to provide judicial
officers for small communities, factors of administrative convenience may favor a separate magistrate's court.
The absence of precise empirical data about the needs and
administrative functioning of the judicial system59 precludes the
possibility of evaluating the relative merits of the two alternatives
in terms of North Dakota's particular needs, a fact which may
suggest that the constitution should be drafted with the flexibility
to allow implementation of either system. This flexibility, however,
should not be so great as to allow the concurrent establishment
of both systems for two reasons: First, the dual system may create
confusion about the trial courts' jurisdiction, and, secondly, it would
hamper efforts for effective administrative supervision over the
limited jurisdiction courts by creating two separate channels of
administrative responsibility.
If the constitution allows the establishment of either alternative, the Constitutional Convention must decide whether the judiciary
or the legislature will have the option of selecting the alternative.
In making this decision the Convention should consider both the judiciary's expertise and interest in efficient administration of the system and the legislature's interest in deciding whether the primary
purpose of giving limited jurisdiction to magistrates is to ease the
burden of the general jurisdiction courts or to provide more courts
60
for small communities.
4. The Supreme Court
To allow the opportunity for appeals from the decisions of trial
courts and to establish a body which can speak with final authority
for the entire state in interpreting questions of law, the constitution
should provide for a supreme court as one division of the unified
59. See note 27 supra.
60. The legislative interest in providing magistrate's courts for small communities was
discussed with regard to the question of that court's jurisdiction. In discussing the differences between a separate magistrate's court and a system of magistrates attached to
the general Jurisdiction court, it was suggested that the former alternative might be a
better means of meeting the goal of providing judicial officers for these communities.
Thus, it follows that the legislature has an interest in making the decision between the
alternatives.
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judicial structure. The particular issues for the Constitutional Convention with regard to the supreme court concern the composition
and jurisdiction of the court. 61
The number of justices sitting on the supreme court varies
from state to state, with most states having a chief justice and
four, six, or eight associate justices.62 There is no ideal choice
between these alternatives, although the total number of justices
should be odd to avoid an evenly divided court, and probably should
not exceed nine for reasons of administrative convenience.63
Regardless of the number of justices ultimately chosen, the
constitution should either establish the number as a constitutional
mandate or provide that the number cannot be altered unless the
request is initiated by the supreme court." Such a provision is
necessary to protect the judiciary against political interference of
the type exerted by President Roosevelt with his court packing
plan. 65
The constitution should explicitly provide that the supreme court
has appellate jurisdiction over the entire state and that it has
the power to issue any writs necessary to aid its exercise of that
jurisdiction." Although the right to at least one appeal in all cases
has become a tradition in our legal system, some judicial reformers
have suggested that this right should be eliminated in certain civil
cases.67 Regardless of one's views as to the merit of these proposals, their very existence suggests that the Constitutional Convention
should be hesitant to restrict the constitution's flexibility by guaranteeing the right to appeal in all cases. Nonetheless, it would be
appropriate for the constitution to guarantee the right of appeal to
defendants in criminal cases 6s and to persons against whom a judgment declaring a statute unconstitutional is entered. 69
61. The present North Dakota Constitution provides for a supreme court of five Justices with statewide appellate Jurisdiction. N.D. CONST. art. iv 11 86, 87, 89.
62. THE BOOK OF THE STATES: 1970-1971, at 121 (1970).
63. Stuart, Iowa Supreme Court Congestion: Can We Avert a Cr4sM?, 55 Iowa '. Rhy.
594, 597 (1970).
64. See ALAs. CONST. art. IV, § 2. If the Constitutional Convention decides that a supreme court should be able to alter or initiate a request for altering the number of Justices, it should consider requiring that the decision be unanimous. This would avoid the
potential for internal court politics to influence the request for change.
65. See note 17 8upra.
66. Since the supreme court lacks adequate facilities to engage in the fact finding
process, the Jurisdictional statement should specifically exclude the possibility for the
supreme court's exercise of original Jurisdiction. See A3A MODEL § 2(2) (A) & Comment.
It would also be desirable for the constitution to eliminate the possibility for de novo
supreme court review of the entire record of a case. See UNnmID COURT STUDY, Supra
note 27, at 27-28. Since the legislature apparently has the power to provide for a de nevo
supreme court review, see N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 86, and since it has exercised this power
in the past, N.D CENT. CODE § 28-27-32 (repealed 1971), it would be appropriate for the
constitution to state explicity that the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction does not include de novo review.
67. See e.g., Hazard, After the Trial Courts--The Realities of Appellate Review, in THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 79-84 (Jones ed. 1965).
68. See ADA MODEL § 2(2)(B).
69. Of. FIA. CoNsT. art. V, § 4(2): "Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly
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If the right to appeal in all cases is not explicitly granted
in the constitution, the Convention must decide whether power to

limit the court's jurisdiction should be delegated to the judiciary or
the legislature7° On the one hand, the judiciary has an interest in
insuring that it is not overburdened with insignificant appeals, and
its experience gives it the expertise to formulate the jurisdictional
limitations most likely to accomplish this end. On the other hand,
any potential litigant has an interest in the question of whether
he will have the right of appeal, and arguably the people should
have the opportunity to express themselves on this issue through
the legislature.
5.

Intermediate Appellate Court

The federal judicial system 7' and a growing number of state
court systems, 72 primarily in the more populous states, include an

intermediate appellate court to ease the workload of the supreme
court. 73 It is doubtful that the need for such a court exists at the
present time in North Dakota, but the need may arise in the future.
The Constitutional Convention must decide whether the need for
such a court is sufficiently foreseeable to justify reference to it in
the judicial article now, or whether the need is so remote that
to the supreme court, as a matter of right, only from . . . final judgments or decrees
directly passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution .... " Although presumably the body with the power to determine the extent of appellate review will formulate rules that will permit the supreme court to decidel all important constitutional issues, the failure to limit the right of appeal in the manner suggested in the text would
create the possibility of raising spurious constitutional claims in order to obtain appellate
review. This in turn would create issues as to whether a particular constitutional claim
fell within the meaning of the jurisdictional statement. See Baum, The Illinois Supreme
Court and Direct Appeals in Constitutional Cases: An A-aly&18 of Judicial Method, 43
CHI.

B.

Rzc. 421 (1962).

If the constitution provides for an intermediate appellate court, the Convention should consider providing that the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals from judgments holding a statute unconstitutional and from criminal
convictions which result in the imposition of specified serious penalties. Cf. FLA. CONST.
art. 5, § 4(2); ABA MODEL § 2(2)(B). The supreme court should rule on the former
cases in order to avoid the potential for conflicting constitutional interpretations in
various parts of the state, and it should rule on the latter ones to insure that serious
sanctions are not imposed against an individual without giving him the right to review
before the highest court in the state. In both types of cases the appeals should be directly to the supreme court in order to avoid the time and expense of two appeals.
70. Many state constitutions delegate this power to the legislature. E.g., OMs CONST.
art. VII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. 5,
§ 1. However, the ABA Model suggests that the power be delegated to the supreme
court. ABA MODEL § 2(2) (B). Cf. ILL. CONST. art 6, § 4(c). In addition to these alternatives, the Constitutional Convention should consider delegating this power to both the
judiciary and the legislature in a manner similar to that discussed with regard to delegation of rule making power. See pp. 251-52 infra.
71. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
72. See e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 1; PA. CONST art. 5, § 1;
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
73. Other alternatives for reducing the supreme court's workload, such as allowing the
court to sit in divisions or increasing the number of supreme court justices, have been
suggested, but none of these alternatives is as desirable as an intermediate appellate court See Stuart, Iowa Supreme Court Congestion: Can We Avert A Criae?, 55 IowA
Ll.Rav. 594 (1970).
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any provision for an intermediate appellate court should be made
74
by constitutional amendment.
An intermediate appellate court, if provided for in the constitution, should be one division of the unified judicial court. For administrative convenience, the constitution should allow the court to
be divided into districts. 75 To insure that questions brought before
the court will receive due deliberation, and to avoid the appearance
of the arbitrary substitution of one judge's views for another's,
the constitution should provide that each individual court be composed of at least three judges.7" For the same reasons, and on
the basis of the same factors discussed with regard to the general
jurisdiction trial court, the constitution should delegate either t o
the legislature or to the judiciary the power to determine the
size and number of districts and the total number of intermediate
77
appellate judges.
Jurisdictional rules will be necessary to allocate the appellate
review power between the supreme court and the intermediate court.
With the exception of the specific constitutional provisions regarding
7
appellate jurisdiction discussed in relation to the supreme court, 8
and possibly a provision giving the intermediate court power to hear
administrative appeals, 79 the power to make these jurisdictional
decisions should be delegated to either the legislature or the judiciary.
This will allow the flexibility necessary to make the most efficient
allocation of appellate resources.
The factors favoring delegation of this jurisdictional power to
the judiciary and the legislative interest in determining which cases
are appealable are the same as those discussed in conjunction with
the supreme court's jurisdiction. 0 However, the legislative interest
in merely allocating jurisdiction between the two appellate courts
is not significant. Furthermore, giving this power to the legislature
would allow it to interfere with the judicial function by curtailing
the supreme court's jurisdiction if it were displeased with a particular trend of decisions. While this danger could be avoided by
detailing the supreme court's jurisdiction in the constitution, such
a solution would unduly curtail the flexibility needed to allocate
appellate resources most efficiently.
This analysis may suggest that an appropriate allocation of
74. The same alternatives for delaying initial implementation of this court that were
suggested with regard to the magistrate's court are available here. See p. 231 tnfra.
75. See ABA MODEL § 3 & Comment.
76. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 NARv. L. REV. 542, 561-563 (1969).
77.
See pp. 227-29 supra.

78.

See note 69 supra.

79.

See ABA MODEL § 3; note 40 supra.

80.

See p. 234 supra.
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jurisdictional power would be to give the legislature power to determine what cases are appealable and the judiciary power to allocate
the appellate workload between the two courts. However, since the
development of detailed rules by both bodies could create confusion, 81
it would be preferable to delegate the total jurisdictional power to
one body or to provide for concurrent power in the manner suggest2
ed infra with regard to rule making power.
6. Additional Courts
The North Dakota Constitution provides for a supreme court,
several trial courts, and "such other courts as may be created by
law for cities, incorporated towns and villages." 's Since the number
of judicial officers in the various divisions of a unified judicial court
may be adjusted to meet changing demands, there should be no
need to provide for the creation of "other courts" in the new judicial
article. Conceivably, however, there may be an interest in preserving the present county courts or municipal courts. 85 If this is the
case, the Constitutional Convention should address itself to the question of the desirability of maintaining these courts in light of the
effect that their existence may have on the unified court structure.
For example, a municipal court with jurisdiction that may overlap
with that of another court and with an independent financial base
cannot be an integral part of an effective unified court system. 6
If the Constitutional Convention wishes to preserve fully the benefits
of unification, it should specifically designate any additional court
by name, include it among the divisions of the centrally financed
unified judicial court, and with respect to such additional court, deal
with the issues discussed above in conjunction with the other divisions
of the judicial court.
C. Judicial Officers8"
1. Eligibility
Two basic questions which the Constitutional Convention should
consider with regard to eligibility for judicial office are (1) the
nature and extent of' the criteria which should be set forth in
the constitution and (2) the extent to which it may be appropriate
to delegate to some body the power to establish additional criteria.
81. E.g., if the legislature were to create a new class of appealable cases not specifically dealt with in the court rules, to which court should the appeal be taken?
82. See pp. 251-52 ftfra.
83. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 85. See also N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 113.
84. N.D. OONST. art. IV, §§ 110, 111. See note 37 aupra.
85. N.D. CONST. art. IV,
§113; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 40-18 (1960). See note 34 8upa.
86. See note 39 &upraand accompanying text.
87. In this section, unless the context indicates a different meaning, judicial office refers to the offices of supreme court justice, trial and appellate judge, and magistrate;
and the terms Judicial officer and Judge refer to the individuals who hold those offices.
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In considering both questions the Convention should keep in mind
both the desirability of insuring that only qualified individuals will
be considered for judicial office and the danger of imposing unneces-

sary eligibility requirements that may exclude some highly qualified
individuals from judicial office.
Presumably for the purpose of insuring that judicial officers

have a primary allegiance to the state and some familiarity with
its problems, state constitutions typically provide that judges must
be citizens of the United States and residents or domiciliaries of
the state.88 Although it is questionable whether as a practical matter these restrictions are necessary, it is unlikely that their inclusion
in the constitution would unduly restrict selection of well qualified
judges. The only restriction of this nature likely to exclude qualified
persons would be a durational residency requirement, and for this
reason, it would be appropriate to express any limitations based
on ties with the state in terms of domicile rather than residence. 9
A constitutional provision requiring that judges and magistrates
be residents of the district from which they are selected might tend
to insure some community familiarity with its judicial officers.
However, except for this possibility, any benefits of such a requirement are dubious, and even familiarity cannot be guaranteed without
imposing a durational residency requirement, which would be un-

desirable for the reasons suggested above. 90
The most significant requirements for the Constitutional Convention to consider with regard to eligibility are (1) a provision
stating that all judicial officers must be licensed to practice law
in North Dakota 91 and (2) a provision making it clear that all
of these positions are full-time. 92 The desirability of these require88. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 5(2). Cf. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 94.
89. The term domicile Is commonly used to refer to the place that an individual considers as his permanent abode, the place to which he plans to return when called away,
without reference to the length of time he has actually spent In that place. See State v.
Atti, 127 N.J.L. 39, 21 A.2d 603, 605 (1941). Although the term residence is sometimes
used in this same sense, see e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-01-26 (1960) as interpreted in
City of Enderlin v. Pontiac Tp., Cass County, 62 N.D. 105, 242 N.W. 117 (1932), it also
may mean a temporary abode, see In re Campbell's Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 11
N.*W.2d 786, 789 (1943), or a place where one has lived for a certain length of time, see
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-10-19 (1960), which defines a student who has been a resident
(i.e. domiciliary) of the state for less than twelve months as a non-resident student
90. If the Constitutional Conventlon chooses to provide for election of judges, the
elective process itself should be sufficient to insure that judges are known in the communities In which they serve.
91. The North Dakota Constitution requires that Judges of the supreme court, district
court, and county court of increased jurisdiction be "learned in the law." N.D. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 94, 107, 111. At least two state bar association studies have recommended
that a similar eligibility requirement be imposed for all trial court judges. Blinn, supra
note 31, at 372; UNIFnED COURT STUDY, supra note 27, at 35. Regardless of to which judicial officers the requirement may be made applicable, the rather vague "learned In the
law" language should be replaced by a statement Indicating that the judge must be admitted to the practice of law in the state.
92. See Blinn, supra note 31, at 372-81. Although the American Bar Association's
Model Judicial Article does not address itself directly to this point, It is implicit that
all Judicial offices are full-time positions from the requirements (1)
that all judicial
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ments for justices and judges should be clear, but there may
be some question with regard to their appropriateness for magistrates. Requiring full-time, legally trained magistrates would undoubtedly foreclose the possibility of having magistrates for many
small communities. The Convention must weigh this factor against
the need to insure a high quality of justice at the lowest levels of
the judicial system.9 3
Any additional eligibility requirements (e.g. requirements based
on age or experience) would have the potential for excluding some
highly qualified persons from judicial office. Rather than imposing
such requirements, it would be more appropriate to rely on the
selection process to produce the best qualified persons. For this
reason, the constitution should limit any eligibility requirements
to the types suggested here and make it clear that no body has
the power to impose additional requirements.9 4
2.

Judicial Selection.
(a)

Initial Selection

The method employed for selecting judicial officers should be
geared to selecting the most capable individuals with the least
amount of political interference. Ironically, the question of how
to accomplish this objective has become a major political issue in
the area of judicial reform, 95 and early indications suggest that
this phenomenon will exist in North Dakota. 96
The basic controversy over selection centers around the question
of whether judges should be elected or appointed. While opinion is
divided as to whether the best elective method is non-partisan or
partisan, there is general agreement among advocates of judicial reform that the best appointive system is one in which the governor
selects judges from a list of candidates proposed by a nominating
commission.9 7 There are responsible advocates for both the elective
officers must be admitted to the practice of law in

the state and

(2)

that no Judicial

officer shall engage in the practice of law. ABA MODEL §§ 5(2), 6(4). Cf. ILL. CONST. art.
6, § 13(b).
93. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
94. A statement of the specific eligibility requirements and the absence of any suggestion that the legislature or some other body can impose additional requirements should
be sufficient for this purpose. See ABA MODEL § 5 (2).
95.

See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, THE PARADOX OF JUDICIAL REFORM: THE KANSAS

EXPERENcE (1970).
96. Already two justices of the North Dakota supreme court have taken opposing
positions on the question of judicial selection, Addresses by Justices Teigen and Strutz,
North Dakota Constitutional Convention Committee on Judicial Functions and Political
Subdivisions, Aug. 30, 1971. At least one North Dakota politician has stated that he will
work for the defeat of any constitutional revision that includes a provision for selection
of judges by an appointive system. See Grand Forks Herald, July 24, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
97. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 44-49;, Harding, The Case for Partisan
Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162 (1969) ; Watson, Judging the Judges, 53 JUDICATURE
283 (1970).
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and the appointive alternatives, and there is a wealth of literature on
the subject, 8 all of which unfortunately suffers from the unavailability
of meaningful comparative studies.
An important question with which the Convention must deal is
whether the constitution itself should set forth the method of selection or whether that power should be delegated to some specified
body. If the latter alternative is chosen, the legislature would be
the most appropriate body since choosing the appropriate selection
method has become a major political issue. Delegating this power to
the legislature, however, would have undesirable ramifications.
Judges, who presumably have some interest and expertise in choosing
the selection method, would be forced to participate in the legislative
process, if that process were to have the benefit of their wisdom. In
addition, if the legislature ultimately chose the elective method, an
individual's opinion as to the appropriate selection method could become a political issue in the selection process itself.
If the Convention chooses to establish an appointive system
with a nominating commission, it should provide in the constitution
for the selection and composition of the commission to insure that
political influences in selecting the membership of the commission
are minimized. 99 To avoid the possibility of the governor's circumventing the nominating commission by refusing to select any of
the nominees, the constitution should also provide that if a selection
is not made within a specified time by the governor, some other
person, probably the chief justice, can make the selection. 100
If the Convention prefers the elective method, the constitution
should include a provision defining the appropriate constituencies for
the various elective positions. 01 Since there is lack of agreement on
the question of whether the 'election should be non-partisan, it would
not be inappropriate for the Convention to leave the resolution of
this issue to the legislature. 0 2
Strong opposing opinions as to the most appropriate selection
98.

In view of the extensive literature on the subject, see e.g.,

SELECTED READINGS ON

OF JUSTICE AND ITS IMPROVEMENT,
Supra
note 1, at 3-50; ABA
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 51-53 (bibliography); Burnett, Observations on the Direct
Election Method of Judicial Selection, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1098 (1966); Keefe, Judges and
THE

ADMINISTRATION

Politics: The Pennsylvania Plan of Judge Selection, 20 U.

PrrT.

L.

REV. 621 (1959),

and

the fact that a note in this issue of the Law Review deals exclusively with aaternative
methods of judicial selection. Note, Judicial Selection in North Dakota-Is Constitutional
Revision Necessary? 48 N.D. L. REV. 327 (1971), this article does not includo a discussion of the alleged merits of various selection methods.
99. See ABA MODEL § 10 & Comment.
100. See ABA MODEL § 5 & Comment.
101. Presumably supreme court justices would be elected in a state-wide election, and
other judges would be elected by a vote of the people in their respective distriets.
See e.g., N.D. CONST. art. IV,

§§

90, 104.

102. See e.g., N.D. CONST. art. IV, §§ 90, 104, 110; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16-08-01, 40-2106 (1960). Of. MICH. CONST. art. 6, §§ 2, 8, 12, 16.
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method may lead the Convention to conclude that it should establish
one system in the constitution but delegate to the legislature power
to change that system. Yet, if the legislature's power in this regard
were unlimited, there would be little reason to set forth a method
of judicial selection in the constitution in the first place. In order
to avoid this inconsistency, the Convention could draft two separate
sections outlining the selection alternatives and provide that one
method shall be operative unless the legislature provides for implementation of the other. 103
(b)

Filling Vacancies

If the constitution provides an appointive system for initial selection, this same process would be appropriate for selecting judges
to fill vacancies which may occur in judicial offices. The elective
system, however, is not well-suited to filling vacancies. In order to
meet caseload needs, it may be appropriate to select a judge to
fill a vacancy before the next general election, yet a separate
election held earlier solely for this purpose would be both time
consuming and expensive. There is no ideal resolution of this problem. Filling vacancies by an appointive system would be inconsistent with the premise that judges should be elected. 1°4 If these inconsistencies are minimized by providing that the appointment will
be effective only until the next general election, this limitation
on the tenure of office may discourage the most qualified applicants
from filling vacancies. 0 5 The optimal solution may be to provide
that vacancies shall be filled by appointment for a term of office
that is shorter than the normal term of office, but long enough to
make the position attractive. If this option is chosen, it would be
appropriate to delegate the appointive power to the supreme court or
the governor. Either alternative would obviate the necessity of establishing a nominating commission, which would have only limited functions, and the former alternative would probably be the best method
of insuring rapid appointment to meet existing caseload demands. 1 6
3. Tenure and Re-selection
Although the Federal Constitution provides that all judges shall
hold office "during good behavior,'107 state constitutions commonly
103. The problems created by delegating the power to choose the selection method would,
of course, remain regardless of whether the legislature's choice were limited in this manner.
104. This inconsistency, which exists In a number of states, seee.g., N.D. CONST. art.
IV, H§ 90', 98; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2(a) & (b); MINN. CoNST. art. 6, §§ 9, 10, becomes
significant when one realizes that the majority of Judicial officers are inltlly selected
to fill vacancies. ABA HANDBOOK, 8uipra note 1, at 44.
105. See note III infra and accompanying text.
106. See ABA MODEL § 5(1) & Comment. Cf. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 98.
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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limit the term of each judicial office, without, however, limiting the
number of terms for which a judge may serve. 108 The federal system has the advantage of insulating a judge from political pressure
to remove him from office. This advantage, however, may be more
than offset by the desirability of regularly reviewing each judge's
performance to insure replacement of unqualified judges. 0 9
If the Constitutional Convention concludes that it is appropriate
to place limits on terms of office, it should set forth in the judicial
article the length of each term. In the absence of variations in
eligibility requirements or selection methods, there is no reason
to distinguish between judicial officers of various courts in setting
terms of office, 110 nor is there any particular length of term which
is most desirable. The term should be long enough to provide
an adequate basis for evaluation and to make the position attractive to potential candidates, but short enough to allow reasonably
prompt replacement of judges who are not satisfactorily performing their duties."1 Since the greatest uncertainty with regard to
any particular judge exists at the time of his initial selection, it
may be desirable for the judicial article to provide a shorter tenure
12
after initial selection than after re-selection.
Many advocates of an appointive system for initial judicial selection suggest that the decision to return a judge to the bench at
the expiration of his term should be left to the electorate."18 Despite
the inconsistency in this position," 4 it may provide a workable political compromise between the advocates of the different selection methods. Except to the extent that one is influenced by the political
benefits of compromise, the questions of which system should be
established to determine re-selection and the extent to which the
legislature should have the power to modify the system are the
same as in the case of initial selection.
Regardless of which re-selection method it chooses, the Constitutional Convention should address itself to the issue of what ques108.

E.g., N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 90; MINK. CONST. art. 6, § 4; CoN. CONST. art. 5,
2 ; MICHo. CONST. art. 6, § 2; Tvx. CONST. art. 5, § 2; AnK. CONST. art. 7. § 6.
109. See Winters, Consensus of Judicial Selection Proposals, 28 AM. JuD. SOC'y. 107,
108 (1944); Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL.
L. REv. 4, 37-38 (1948). contra, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 510 (Mod. Library ed.)
(Hamilton).
110. If some Judges do not need to be trained lawyers, there presumably is a greater
likelihood that they may not be capable of performing their functions adequately, and
thus reason to provide a shorter term of office for these positions. Similarly, if the constitution provides for initial selection either by election or by appointment from a nominating list but allows certain Judges to be appointed in a different manner, it may be
appropriate to provide a shorter term of office for those Judges. See p. 240 infra; ABA
MODEL I 5(1).
111. ABA MODEL § 6(1) & Comment.
112. See ABA MODEL § 6.
113. See Note, sUPra note 98, at 329, 333-34; ABA MODEL § 6.
114. The advantages of the appointive system for initial selection, see Note, supra note
98, at 332-35, would seem equally applicable in the case of re-selection.
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tion should be asked when a judge seeks to remain in office for
another term. There are two alternatives: The question can be
"Who is the best qualified person to fill this position?" or it can be
"Has the judge seeking another term done an adequate job?" At
first glance, asking the former question would appear to be the
more appropriate way of maintaining the highest quality judiciary.
However, asking the latter question may, in the long run, do more
to accomplish this result because it offers a greater guarantee of
job security. Presumably some of the individuals best qualified
to be judges would have to give up established, lucrative law practices to serve on the bench. They may be reluctant to do this
if there is a substantial possibility that they will be turned out of
office after one term. Asking the second question insures their
return to the bench if their work has been satisfactory.
Once the Constitutional Convention decides which of the two
questions should be asked, it should include in the judicial article
a provision to implement its decision. If the method of re-selection
is elective and the question is who is the best qualified candidate,
the incumbent should be required to run in an election where
he may be challenged by other candidates seeking his position. If
the second question (i.e., Has the judge performed competently?)
is asked under the elective system, the judge should run unopposed
with the only question being: Shall he be returned to office?
Under the appointive system, there need be no distinction between initial appointment and re-appointment if the first question is
asked. However, if the second question is asked, the judicial article
should provide either that the governor or the nominating committee
has a duty to return the same candidate to office unless he is unqualified to serve. 15
4.

Removal

The Constitutional Convention should not ignore the fact that
occasionally it may be appropriate to remove judges from office
prior to the expiration of their terms. In order to deal with these
situations, the constitution should address itself to the questions of
grounds for removal and the method by which removal is accomplished. 1"6
115. If the nominating commission or governor is unwilling to return the Judge to office, it would be appropriate for this decision to be made only after a hearing of the
type contemplated in removal situations. See pp. 244-45.
116. On the question of removal see generally Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and

How Four States Deal With It,

35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 151

(1970)

; Frankel, Judicial

Discipline and Removal, 44 TEx. L. Rnv. 1117 (1966) ; Lesar, A Proposal for the Removal
or Retirement of Unfit Judges, N4 VA. L. REv. 554 (1968); Note, Remedies for Judicial
Misconduct and Disability; Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 149
(1966).
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(a)

Grounds for Removal

The reasons for seeking the removal of a judge fall into three
broad categories: (1) mental or physical incapacity; (2) participation in activities inconsistent with the holding of judical offcie;
117
and (3) failure to perform judicial duties.
Although a variety of factors may suggest incapacity, any attempt to delineate specific factors, whether in the constitution or
elsewhere, would be of only limited assistance in applying that
concept to particular individuals. Furthermore, since any delineation
of factors may implicitly exclude factors not listed, the delineation
may, in the long run, be detrimental to achieving the removal of
incapacitated judges. Rather than attempting to define incapacity
with precision, the constitution should simply provide that mental
and physical incapacity are grounds for removal."'
The second category presents a more complicated problem for
the Constitutional Convention because of the difficulty in determining what types of activities are in fact inconsistent with the holding
of judicial office. 19 To insure the integrity and independence of the
judiciary, it would be appropriate for the constitution to prohibit
120
judges from running for or holding any elective non-judicial office,
and from engaging in the practice of law while serving on the
bench.12' Beyond this, the Constitutional Convention may want to
consider including in the judicial article a prohibition against judges'
contributing to or holding office in political organizations or participating in political campaigns (except, of course, their own campaigns for judicial office if they must run for election) .122 This type
of restriction, however, could raise more problems than it solves:
Is an anti-war group a political organization? If a judge's spouse
is running for political office and financing the campaign with
family assets, is the judge contributing to a political campaign? 12
The need for more precise definitions in this area, and the
desirability of limiting the constitution's content to basic principles
are factors which suggest that specific constitutional restrictions
on the conduct of judges be limited to fundamental, clearly definable
117. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 58-60; McKay, The Judiciary and Non judicial
Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 12, 19 (1970).
118. Attaching unnecessary stigma to this category by using terms which may Imply
wrongdoing could make the body which is responsible for removal reluctant to act for
fear of damaging a judge's reputation. It would be desirable to avoid the term removal
altogether for this category and refer to it as retirement for Incapacity. See ABA MODEL
§ 6(3).
119. See Kaufman, Lions or Jackels: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 5 (1970); McKay, supra note 117, at 13-14, 19-36.
120. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 6(4). Cf. N.D. OONST. art IV, § 119; ILL. CoNs'r. art. 6,
§ 13.
121. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 6(4); N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 117.
122. See citations, eupra note 120.
123. Karlen & Miller, supra note 16, at 24.
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prohibitions. To insure that these few restrictions are not the only
bases for removing judges who engage in improper conduct, the
constitution should provide that judges may be removed "for
cause."124 This term is broad enough to encompass the third category (failure to perform judicial duties), so no additional statement
is needed to cover this situation.
Although in the absence of any specific prohibition the judiciary
would presumably be free to give specific content to the "cause"
standard by promulgating canons of judicial ethics, 12 5 it would not

be inappropriate for the constitution to delegate this power specifically to the judiciary or the legislature. 2 8 On the one hand, judges

are most directly affected by these types of problems and probably
have the best understanding of the issues that are likely to arise.
This expertise and the desirability of maintaining an independent
judiciary1 27 suggest that the power should be delegated to the judiciary. 12 81 On the other hand, concern about the interest of the
people in setting high standards for their judges and doubts about
the potential effectiveness of self-regulation are factors which would
1
suggest that the power be delegated to the legislature.

(b)

29

Method of Removal

The method by which judges can be removed should have the
following characteristics: It should be readily accessible to individuals who have grievances, but at the same time it should have
the ability to weed-out unmeritorious complaints without embarrassing a judge or making too great a demand on his time; it
should have the respect of the bar, the judiciary, and the public;
it should have the resources to act quickly when the need arises;
it should be independent from political pressures; it should be flexible enough to allow imposition of a number of sanctions including,
and it should provide the judge with
but not limited to, removal;
180
a full and fair hearing.
The extent to which these various objectives can be met will
depend to a large extent on the make-up of the body that has the
power to remove judges. There are several alternatives from which
to choose, ranging from the legislature (through impeachment or
address), 181 to the supreme court (except, of course, for cases inSee e.g., ABA MODEL § 6(4). Cf. ILL. CONST. art 6, § 15(e).
See e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS.
126. See Karlen & Miller, supra note 16, at 24, 31.
127. See Irvin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 85 LAw & Oow Tsmp. PROS.
108, 127 (1970); Shipley, Legislative Control of Judicial Behavior, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROS. 178, 194-200 (1970).
128. See Clark, Judicial Self Regulation-It Potential, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 37
(1970) ; Cusack v. Howlett, 44 Ill. 2d 233, 254 N.E.2d 506, 508 (1969).
129. See Cusack v. Howlett, 4.4 III.2d 233, 254 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1969).
130. See Braithwaite, supra note 116, at 167-70.
131. See e.g., NEM. CONST. art. III, § 17.
124.
125.
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volving supreme court justices) ,182 to the bar association, 8 s to a
special commission or court on the courts. 1 8 Each alternative has
its own strengths and weaknesses, and none is so inherently better
18 5
than the others that compelling reasons exist for its selection.
The uncertainty as to the most appropriate method for removing
judges would be a legitimate reason for the Constitutional Convention to forego establishing a particular system in the judicial article
and instead to delegate this power to either the legislature or the
judiciary. If the Convention chooses this alternative, it should delegate the power to the same body to which it delegates the power to
determine the standards of judicial conduct. The factors to consider
in making the delegation are the same in both instances.
5. Retirement
Although a mandatory retirement age for judges would force
some qualified judges out of office, such a provision would provide
a simple means of insuring against the continued service by individuals who become incapacitated with age. 188 Particularly if the term
of office for which a judge is selected is lengthy, this type of safe187
guard becomes important.
Unless the Constitutional Convention chooses to preclude the possibility for setting a mandatory retirement age for judges, the constitution should either set the age limit or delegate the power to do
so to the legislature or judiciary. Since experience may indicate that
an appropriate mandatory age limit established today may be too
restrictive in the future, it would be appropriate for the Constitutional
Convention to select the delegation alternative. However, since it is
unlikely that it would ever be desirable to set the limit below age
sixty-five, the constitution should probably place this minimum limitation on the age that may be established. 88
The most appropriate retirement ages for different types of jobs
may vary, and presumably the judiciary would have the greatest
expertise in selecting the appropriate age for judges. The judiciary,
however, for fear of embarrassing one of its own members, might be
reluctant to set the optimal age limitation if one or more judges
132. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 6(4).
133. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 56.
134. See e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 18; CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §
22. See also Karlen & Miller, supra note 16, at 22-23; Note, The Commission Plan: A
Corrective Remedy for Judicial Misconduct in Iowa, 55 IowA L. REV. 1020 (1970). For a
discussion of the success of the nlinots, California, and New York commissions see
Braithwaite, supra note 116; Frankel, supra note 116.
135. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 55-58; Braithwaite, supra note 116.
136. See ABA MODEL § 6(2) & Comment. The majority of state constitutions provide
for a mandatory retirement age, with the age varying from 70 to 76. See THE BOOK or
THE STATES: 1970-1971, at 128-30 (1970).
137.
' arlen & Miller, supra note 16, at 21.
138. See ABA MODEL § 6(2) & Comment.
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were close to or beyond that age. Although this problem could be
avoided by delegating the power to set the retirement age to the
legislature, there is the possibility that that body would use the age
limit as a political expedient to remove an unpopular judge. The problem with either alternative can be minimized by a constitutional requirement that each judge must retire at the age specified at the
time of his initial appointment.1 39
Competent judges who have retired either voluntarily or because
of a mandatory age limit should be available for temporary judicial
service in times of unusual caseload demands.1 40 To allow this possibility the constitution should authorize the chief justice or the supreme court to make such temporary appointments. 14 ' It is important that this power be delegated to the judiciary in order to insure
4 2
a rapid response to immediate needs.
6.

Compensation

Since rational decisions with regard to salary and fringe benefits must be made in light of changing economic conditions, it would
not be appropriate for the constitution to contain a specific salary
schedule for judges. Rather, the power to determine salaries should
be delegated to the legislature, which is responsible for allocating
the state's total resources. To insure that this legislative power is
not used to influence judicial decisions and to insure financial secuity for judges, the constitution should explicitly provide that no
judge's salary can be reduced during his current term of office. 4 3
Because it seems inappropriate for judges to lobby for salary
increases'" and because low judicial salaries may deter some qualiSee ABA MODEL § 6(2).
140. The Report of Joint Committees on Judicial Survey for North Dakota included this
among its recommendations. JUDICIAL SURVEY, supra note 28, at 22.
141. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 6(2). Since the Model Article consistently refers to supreme
court judicial officers as justices and limited jurisdiction court judicial officers as magistrates, this section, which refers only to judges, would seem to preclude the possibility
for temporary assignment of retired justices and magistrates. The former exclusion is
probably inadvertent. The latter, however, may be based on the assumption that magistrates, because of their limited jurisdiction and lower salaries, see p. 229 supra, may
not be sufficiently experienced and qualified to perform judicial functions In higher
courts.
142. Although the Report of the Joint Committee on Judicial Survey for North Dakota
is somewhat vague on the delegation issue, It seems to contemplate delegation of the
power to make temporary assignments to the legislature with the assumption that the
legislature will in turn delegate this power to the supreme oourt. JUDICIAL SURVEY, SUPra
note 28, at 22. There Is no reason, however, for the constitution not to delegate this
power directly to the supreme court.
143. ABA HANDBOOK, 8upra note 1, at 49. See ABA MODEL § 7(3). Although such a
constitutional provision is common, see e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; MINN. CONST. art.
6, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 25, the North Dakota Constitution Is silent on the subject.
In conjunction with such a provision, the Constitutional Convention should consider
including in the judicial article a provision that would prevent salary discrimination
resulting from increased salaries for some judges. A prohibition against any salary
change during a judge's term of office would not accomplish this goal since newly selected Judges presumably could receive higher salaries. Howe(ver, this result could be
achieved by requiring uniform salaries for judicial' officers of equal rank. See CAL. CONST.
art. 6, § 17 (1906).
144. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 44.
139.
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fled individuals from serving on the bench, 1' 5 the Constitutional Convention should consider adopting provisions which would establish
minimum levels of compensation for judicial officers. 14

6

For example,

the American Bar Association's Model Judicial Article proposes that
"salaries of justices and judges shall not be less than the highest
salary paid to an officer of the executive branch of the state government other than the governor.'

'-

4

Despite this provision's laudable objective, there are several
factors that the Convention should consider before deciding to incorporate it or a similar provision in the constitution. First, there is no
apparent relationship between salaries that should be paid to judges
and executive officers; 14 secondly, such a provision may deter increasing judicial salaries by in practice becoming a maximum rather
than a minimum; and finally, it is questionable whether constitutional regulation of salaries is consistent with the premise of limiting the constitution to fundamental principles.
7. The Chief Justice
The constitution should specify that one member of the supreme
court is the chief justice with responsibility for presiding over the
court, making temporary assignments of judges,'149 and performing
50
such other duties as may be delegated to him by the constitution.

The constitution should make it clear that the chief justice can retire from this administrative position without retiring from the supreme court,' 51 and it should also provide for the automatic selection,
perhaps on the basis of seniority, of a member of the52 supreme court
to serve as chief justice when that office is vacant.

Presently, the North Dakota Constitution provides that the supreme court justice "having the shortest term to serve, not holding
his office by election or appointment to fill a vacancy, shall be chief
justice."' 53 Since there are five justices elected for staggered ten
145. Reid, Honorable Salaries, Ascertained and Established, 6 N.H. B.J. 193 (1964)
Winters, Better Justice Through Better Paid Judges, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 231 (1962).
146. The cost of maintaining the judiciary in nearly all, if not all, states Is less than
three per cent of the cost of all three branches of government. Hunter, Judicial Compensation, 54 J. Am.JuD. Soc'y. 180, 181 (1970). North Dakota's judicial salaries are among
the lowest in the nation. THE BOOK OF THE STATES: 1970-1971, at 126-7 (1970).
147. ABA MODEL § 7(1). See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 49.
148. Karlen & Miller, supra note 16, at 23.
149. See p. 225 supra.
150. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 8(2).
151. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 8(1).
152. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 8(1); N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 92.
153. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 92. The provision goes on to state that in the case of the
chief justice's absence .
... the judge having in like manner the next shortest term
to serve shall preside in his stead." Although this section was part of the original North
Dakota Constitution and has never been amended or repealed, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has held that another portion of this section, which deals with the time at which
the justices shall take office, applied only to the first justices selected after the adoption of the constitution., State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 160 N.W. 514
(1916). It would be improper to interpret the case as applying to the entire section, since
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year terms,'" the chief justice, in the absence of any vacancies,
would normally be selected on a rotating basis for a term of two
years. 1 55 While this system has the merit of allowing each justice to
share the responsibilities of the office, it may unduly diminish the
prestige of the office. Furthermore, it assumes that each justice is
equally capable of serving in an administrative capacity, and that
the administrative tasks are not so intricate that efficiency is lost
by shifting responsibility every two years. The Constitutional Convention may legitimately question the validity of these assumptions, 56
but if the duties of the chief justice are relatively minor, the questions of his selection and tenure are not critical.
If the administrative responsibilities of the chief justice are substantial, selection and tenure should be important concerns for the
Constitutional Convention. The term of office should be long enough
to allow the chief justice to become familiar with and proficient at
carrying out his administrative duties.157 Since some justices will

undoubtedly be more capable administrators than others, the selection of the chief justice should be purposeful, not random. 58 If the
constitution provides generally for judicial appointment from a list
submitted by a nominating committee, the Convention should consider giving that body the power to make the appointment. 59 In the
such an interpretation would render meaningless the phrases "not holding his office by
election or appointment to fill a vacancy" and "having in like manner." Nonetheless, the
legislature, in 1909, enacted the following statute:
The judge of the supreme court having the shortest term to serve, not
holding office by election or appointment to fill a vacancy, shall be chief
Justice and shall preside at all terms of the supreme court; provided, that
whenever no member of said court is qualified for the office of chief justice
under the above provisions, then the judges of said court shall select the
chief justice. In the absence of the chief justice, the Judge having the next
shortest term to serve, or a judge selected by the court, as the case inay be,
shall preside In his stead. N.D. SEss. LAws ch. 71, § 1 (1909) (Emphasis
added).
In 1967 the legislature amended this section to provide:
The Judges of the supreme court and district courts shall appoint
from the members of the supreme court a chief justice who shall serve for
a term of five years or until his term shall expire, whichever shall first
occur * . . In the absence of the chief justice, the Judge having the shortest
term to serve shall preside in his stead. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-02-01 (Supp.
1971).
Except for the possible limited applicability of these statutory provisions suggested in
note 155 infra, they appear to be both unnecessary and unconstitutional.
154.

N.D. CONsT. art. IV,

§§ 89, 90.

155. Since the constitution provides for vacancies to be filled by appointment "which
shall continue until the first general election," N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 98, the times at
which vacancies occur will affect the term of office for the chief Justice. E.g., if four
vacancies occurred soon after the election of one justice, he would serve as chief Justice
for the remainder of his ten year term. If the four Justices appointed to fill the vacancies were elected to regular terms at the next election, the question arises as to which
of them would become the next chief justice or serve in that capacity during the absence
of the chief Justice. Since § 92 does not address itself to these contingencies, the statutory provisions quoted In note 153 supra, if read as applying only to these types of situations, would not be inconsistent with that section.
156. See ABA HANDBOOK, sup'ra note 1, at 17-20; JUDICIAL SURVEY, ugpra note 28, at 25.
157. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIoN,
1aupra note 1, at 84.
158. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 18.
159. See e.g., ABA MODEL § 8(1) & Comment
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absence of such a committee, the Convention could delegate this
power to the supreme court, 6 0 a special commission made up in
whole or in part of judges,1 61 the governor,1 62 or the legislature. 168
Although the supreme court has the greatest interest in the selection
of the chief justice, delegating this power to the supreme court
64
could contribute to politics and factionalism within the court.
D. Court Administration
One of the greatest needs of any judicial system is efficient administration. 6 5 The unified court structure provides the opportunity
for centralized administration of the entire system, but if efficient
administration is to become a reality, there must be a clear statement of administrative responsibility, 6 6 and the individual or body
responsible for administration must have adequate resources with
which to meet these responsibilities. 6 7 The Constitutional Convention
should address itself to both of these points.
To accomplish the first goal, the judicial article should make an
explicit grant of administrative authority over the entire judicial
system. The most appropriate recipients of this power would be either
68 the supreme court, 6 9
a judicial council of specified membership,
170
or the chief justice of the supreme court.
The judicial council alternative would provide the opportunity
for individuals directly affected by all parts of the judicial system
to have a voice in administrative decisions, and perhaps its members
would be more aware of particular problems in the lower courts.' 71
Placing administrative responsibility in the supreme court would
have the advantage of placing that power in a presumably smaller
body that could more readily meet on a regular basis, and delegation
of the power to the chief justice would have the advantage of ultimate centralization of administrative authority and responsibility.'7 2
Neither of these two alternatives would preclude establishing a judicial council to serve in an advisory capacity.
160. See e.g., TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 2; MicH. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
161. If the constitution provides for the establishment of a Judicial council, this body
could appoint the chief justice.
162. See e.g., N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6(1).
163. See e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 3. Since vacancies in the office of chief Justice may
occur when the legislature is not in session, it would not be appropriate for the constitution to provide that the legislature shall select the chief justice, but the constitution
could delegate the power to prescribe the selection method to the legislature.
164. See ABA MODEL § 8(1), Comment.
165. See generally MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at
29-90; ABA HANDBOOK, &upra note 1, at 13-41, 42-43 (bibliography); U.S. SENATE CoxMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COURT MANAGEMENT STUDY (1970).
166. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 14.
167. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 15.
168. See e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 6.
169. See e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 5(3).
170. See e.g., A1BA MODEL 1 8(2).
171. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 14.
172. See ABA MODEL § 8(2), Comment; Karlen & Miller, aupra note 16, at 26; ABA
HANDBOOKc, supra note 1, at 14.
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Regardless of which of these alternatives is chosen, the administrative authority alone will not have the time and resources to perform all of the necessary administrative functions.17 The judicial
system should have a full-time court administrator with a sufficient
staff to keep track of the caseload of the various courts, make
studies and recommendations for improvement of the system, and
implement the decisions of the administrative authority. 174 In the absence of any constitutional provision to the contrary, the legislature
could create and fund such administrative positions. 175 However, to
insure that sufficient administrative resources will exist, it would
be appropriate for the constitution to provide that the administrative authority shall appoint a full-time court administrator and shall
have the power to appoint all other administrative personnel. 176 Although the extent of these appointments would be limited by the
amount of the general appropriation for operation of the judicial
system, the constitutional mandate to appoint a court administrator
would obligate the legislature to provide sufficient funds for at least
that one position.
E.

Rule Making Power

A second, distinct type of administrative concern about the judicial system is the manner in which cases are brought, issues formed, evidence gathered and presented, and appeals perfected. These
are questions not of internal court administration, but rather questions of judicial procedures. It is inappropriate for the constitution
to deal with these matters in detail, but the Constitutional Convention must decide to which body the rule making power should be
delegated.
Originally in the common law system procedural rules were developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. This gave way to
the legislative promulgation of codes of procedure and evidence in
this country in the nineteenth century, and more recently the trend
has been toward promulgation of rules by the judiciary. 7 7 The most
notable achievement in this regard has been the adoption of the
173.
174.

ABA HANDBOOx, supra note 1, at 15.
See JUDICIAL SURVEY, supra note 28, at 21.

175. Although the North Dakota Constitution makes no reference to a court administrator or a judicial council, the legislature has created a judicial council "to make a continuous study of the operation of the judicial system of the state," N.D. CENT. CODE J
27-15-05 (1960), and the Judicial Council has recently hired a full-time court administrator.
176. See ABA MODEL § 8(2). Note that this provision gives the chief Justice power to
appoint "such assistants as he deems necessary," and thus creates the potential for conflict between the legislature and judiciary. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
177. The history of judicial rule making is traced in Hyde, From Common Law Rules
to Rules of Court, 22 WAsH. U. L.Q. 187 (1937). For an argument that legislative rule
making is unconstitutional in the absence of specific delegation of that power to the
legislature, see Wigmore, All Legislattve Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. Rmv. 276 (1928).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have been used as a model
7
in a number of states, 17 including North Dakota.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, judicial reformers had
been advocating that the judiciary should have the power to promulgate procedural rules, 80 and the widespread adoption and success of
the Federal rules has shown the advantages of judicial rule making.' 8'
Nonetheless, doubts exist about the wisdom of giving unfettered rule
making power to the courts-doubts arising largely from the inherent
difficulty in drawing any clear line between what is procedural and
what is substantive. For example, is a rule making the cost of appeal prohibitive merely procedural or is it substantive? Is the creation of a new evidentiary presumption or privilege substantive or
procedural?
There have been attempts to resolve these types of questions
through detailed definitions of substance and procedure and through
8 2
the substitution of new terminology, but the problem remains.
In essence the Constitutional Convention is faced with the problem of deciding to which body procedural rules, which may admittedly sometimes have substantive impact, should be delegated. While
the legislature has a legitimate interest in the substantive impact of
the rules, the Constitutional Convention should not ignore the judiciary's demonstrated expertise in this area, its ability to adopt and
change rules quickly to meet current needs, and its interest in having efficient judicial procedures.
In light of these dual interests, the Constitutional Convention
should consider the possibility of delegating initial rule making power
to the judiciary and at the same time delegating to the legislature
the power to veto or amend those rules. If the Convention decides
to delegate the rule making power in this manner, it should consider providing limitations on the legislature's power in order to
prevent the gradual legislative usurpation of the court's initial
rule making function. Three possibilities exist: (1) a requirement
that legislative action to veto or amend a court rule requires more
than a simple majority vote in order to avoid unwarranted interference with the initial judicial power; (2) a requirement that any leg178.

See 1 BARRON & 1-OLTZOFF §§ 9-9.53 (Wright ed. 1960).
179. N.D .R. Civ. P.
180. See e.g., Wigmore, supra note 177; Pound, The Rle Making Power of the Courts,
12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
181. See Carey, In Favor of Uniformity, 18 TEMP. L.Q. 145 (1943) ; Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 152, (1948); Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules after Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 174
(1954) ; Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judici-al Rule Making, 55 MicH. L. REV. 623 (1957) ; Vanderbuilt, Improving the Administration of JusticeTwo Decades of Development 90-91 (1957) ; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE I
1008 & n.40 (1969).
182. For an excellent discussion of the problems of categorization and of the legislative
and Judicial interests in rule making, see Levin & Amsterdam, Legislataive Control Over
Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1 (1958).
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islative act vetoing or amending a court rule shall lose its force as
a statute and become only a court rule after a specified number of
years in order to allow flexibility in changing rules to meet current
needs; and (3) a requirement that the chief justice of the supreme
court be allowed to testify before the legislature prior to the enactment of any statute that would modify or veto a court rule. 88
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the lengthy discussion necessitated by the consideration
of numerous alternatives available to the Constitutional Convention
in drafting the judicial article, the judicial article itself can be relatively short. For example, the American Bar Association's Model
Judicial Article, which addresses itself to most of the issues raised
here, consists of only ten sections and less than sixteen hundred
words. Although the Constitutional Convention may disagree with
some of its substantive recommendations, the proposal is illustrative
of a judicial article which is generally consistent with the premise
that a constitution should be limited to statements of fundamental
principles.'" Resolution of the issues raised in this article should not
require a significantly longer document.

183.
184.

Id. at 89-42.
With regard to ABA MODEL §1 7(1)

& 7(2) eee p. 247 supra.
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APPENDIX
Model Judicial Article of the American Bar Association
§ 1. THE JUDICIAL POWER. The judicial power of the state shall be vested
exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be divided into one Supreme
Court, one Court of Appeals, one Trial Court of General Jurisdiction known
as the District Court, and one Trial Court of Limited Jurisdiction known as
the Magistrate's Court.
9 2. THE SUPREME COURT.
9 1 Composition. The Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice
of the State and (four) (six) Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
912 Jurisdiction.
A. Original Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall have no original
jurisdiction, but it shall have the power to issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
B. Appellate jurisdiction. Appeals from a judgment of the District
Court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of 25 years or more, shall be taken directly
to the Supreme Court. In all other cases, criminal and civil, the
Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such
terms and conditions as it shall specify in rules, except that such
rules shall provide that a defendant shall have an absolute right
to one appeal in all criminal cases. On all appeals authorized to
be taken to the Supreme Court in criminal cases, that Court shall
have the power to review all, questions of law and, to the extent
provided by rule, to review and revise the sentence imposed.
1 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS. The Court of Appeals shall consist of as many
divisions as the Supreme Court shall determine to be necessary. Each division of the Court of Appeals shall consist of three judges. The Court of
Appeals shall have no original jurisdiction, except that it may be authorized
by rules of the Supreme Court to review directly decisions of administrative
agencies of the State and it may be authorized by rules of the Supreme
Court to review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the State
and it may be authorized by rules of -the Supreme Court to issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In all other
cases, it shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as the Supreme Court shall specify by rules which shall, however,
provide that a defendant shall have an absolute right to one appeal in all
criminal cases and which may include the authority to review and revise
sentences in criminal cases.
§ 4.

THE DISTRICT AND MAGISTRATE'S COURTS.
1 1 Composition. The District Court shall be composed of such number
of divisions and the District and Magistrate's Courts shall be composed
of such number of judges as the Supreme Court shall determine to be
necessary, except that each district shall be a geographic unit fixed
by the Supreme Court and shall have at least one judge. Every judge
of the District and Magistrate's Courts shall be eligible to sit in every
district.
U 2 District Court Jurisdiction. The District Court shall exercise original
general jurisdiction in all cases, except in so far as original jurisdiction
may be assigned exclusively to the Magistrate's Court by the Supreme
Court rules. The District Court may be authorized, by rule of the
Supreme Court, to review directly decisions of State administrative
agencies and decisions of Magistrate's Courts.
U 3 Magistrate's Court Jurisdiction. The Magistrate's Court shall be a
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court of limited jurisdiction in such cases as the Supreme Court shall
designate by rule.
§ 5. SELECTION OF JUSTICES, JUDGES AND, MAGISTRATES
Il 1 Nomination and Appointment. A vacancy in a judicial office in the
State, other than that of magistrate, shall be filled by the governor
from a list of three nominees presented to him by the Judicial Nominating Commission. If the governor should fail to make an appointment
from the list within sixty days from the day it is presented to him,
the appointment shall be made by the Chief Justice or the Acting Chief
Justice from the same list. Magistrates shall be appointed by the Chief
Justice for a term of three years.
1 2 Eligibility. To be eligible for nomination as a justice of the Supreme
Court, judge of the Court of Appeals, judge of the District Court, or to
be appointed as a 'Magistrate, a person must be domiciled within the
State, a citizen of the United States, and licensed to practice law in
the courts of the State.
§ 6.

TENURE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES.
111 Term of Office. At the next general election following the expiration
of three years from the date of appointment, and every ten years
thereafter, so long as he retains his office, every justice and judge
shall be subject to approval or rejection by the electorate. In the case
of a justice of the Supreme Court, the electorate of the entire state
shall vote on the question of approval or rejection. In the case of
judges of the Court of Appeals and the District Court, the electorate
of the districts or district in which the division of the Court of Appeals
or District Court 'to which he was appointed is located shall vote on
the question of approval or rejection.
9 2 Retirement. Every justice and judge shall retire at the age specified
by statute at the time of his appointment, but that age shall not be
fixed at less than sixty-five years. The Chief Justice is empowered to
authorize retired judges to perform temporary judicial duties in any
court of the State.
1 3 Retirement for Incapacity. A justice of the Supreme Court may be
retired after appropriate hearing, upon certification to the governor,
by the Judicial Nominating Commission for the Supreme Court that
such justice is so incapacitated as to be unable to carry on his, duties.
ff 4 Removal. Justices of the Supreme Court shall be subject to removal
by the impeachment process. All other judges and magistrates shall
be subject to retirement for incapacity and to removal for cause by
the Supreme Court after appropriate hearing. No justice, judge, or
magistrate shall, during his term of office, run for elective office other
than the judicial office which he holds, or directly or indirectly make
any contribution to, or hold any office in, a political party or organization, or take part in any political campaign.

§ 7.

COMPENSATION OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES.
1 1 Salary. The salaries of justices, judges, and magistrates shall be fixed
by statute, but the salaries of the justices and judges shall not be less
than the highest salary paid to an officer of the executive branch of
the State government other than the governor.
ff 2 Pensions. Provision shall be made by the legislature for the payment
of pensions to justices and judges and their widows. In the case of
justices and judges who have served ten years or more, and their
widows, the pension shall not be less than fifty per cent of the salary
received at the time of the retirement or death of the justice or judge.
113 No Reduction of Compensation. The compensation of a justice, judge,
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or magistrate shall not be reduced during the term for which he was
elected or appointed.
§ 8. THE CHIEF JUSTICE
ff 1 Selection and Tenure. The Chief Justice of the State shall be selected
by the Judicial Nominating Commission from the members of the
Supreme Court and he shall retain that office for a period of five years,
subject to reappointment in the same manner, except that a member
of the court may resign the office of Chief Justice without resigning
from the court. During a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice, all
powers and duties of that office shall devolve upon the member of
the Supreme Court who is senior in length of service on that court.
f12 Head of Administration office of the Courts. The Chief Justice of the
State shall be the executive head of the judicial system and shall appoint an administrator of the courts and such assistants as he deems
necessary to aid the administration of the courts of the State. The Chief
Justice shall have the power to assign any judge or magistrate of the
State to sit in any court in the State when he deems such assignment
necessary to aid the prompt disposition of judicial business, but in no
event shall the number of judges and justices exceed the number of
justices provided in section 2. The administrator shall, under the direction of the Chief Justice, prepare and submit to the legislature the
budget for the court of justice and perform all other necessary administrative functions relating to the courts.
§ 9. RULE MAKING POWER. The Supreme Court shalll have the power to
prescribe rules governing appellate jurisdiction, rules of practice and procedure, and rules of evidence, for the judicial system. The Supreme Court
shall, by rule, govern admission to the bar and the discipline of members
of the bar.
§ 10. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS. There shall be a Judicial Nominating Commission for the Supreme Court and one for each division
of the Court of Appeals and the District Court. Each Judicial Nominating
Commission shall consist of seven members, one of whom shall be the
Chief Justice of the State, who shall act as chairman. The members of
the bar of the State residing in the geographic area for which the court of
division sits shall elect three of their number to serve as members of said
commission, and the governor shall appoint three citizens, not admitted
to practice law before the courts of the State, from the residents of the
geographic area for which the court or division sits. The terms of office
and compensation for members of a Judicial Nominating Commission shall
be fixed by the legislature, provided that not more than one-third of a commission shall be elected in any three-year period. No member of a Judicial
Nominating Commission shall hold any other public office or office in a
political party or organization and he shall not be eligible for appointment
to a State judicial office so long as he is a member of a Judicial Nominating
Commission and for a period of five years thereafter.

